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LOOKING THROUGH THE PRISM OF PRIVACY AND
TRESPASS: SMARTPHONES AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Dr. Saby Ghoshray*
INTRODUCTION
Technology in the twenty-first century has dramatically changed our lives, but
the law has not kept pace with technological advances. The treatment of
smartphones in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is no exception. This is made
evident by the increasingly scattered outcomes of litigation involving the privacy
interests of smartphone owners.' As the cross-jurisdictional inconsistencies of judicial decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to smartphones mount, I am
drawn to seek answers from two foundational pillars of the Supreme Court's
search and seizure jurisprudence: protection against invasions of privacy and the
bulwark against trespass.
In State v. Smith,2 the Ohio Supreme Court confronted the widening gap between technological advancement and the progress of the law. Wisely, the court
noted that existing privacy doctrines may be ill-suited to today's technologically
sophisticated cell phones. 3 Conversely, in People v. Diaz,4 the California Supreme Court refused to block the admission of evidence obtained during a war* Dr. Saby Ghoshray's scholarship focuses on constitutional law, corporate law, corporate governance, fourth amendment jurisprudence, and cyberspace law, among other fields. His work has
appeared in a number of publications, including the Albany Law Review, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, European Law Journal ERA-Forum, Toledo Law Review, Georgetown
International Environmental Law Review, Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review, Fordham
International Law Journal, Santa Clara Law Review, Michigan State International Law Journal,
Loyola Law Journal, New England Law Review and Miami Law Review, among others. The author
would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her assistance in legal research and typing of the manuscript,
and his beautiful children, Shreyoshi and Sayantan, for their patience and understanding. Dr.
Ghoshray can be reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1 See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REv. 581 (2011).
See also Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause Courts to Reconsider Fourth
Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MiEM. L. Ri-v. 233 (2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1708469.
2 920 N.E. 2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
3 Id. See also Stephen J. Kobrin, With Technology Growing, Our Privacy Is Shrinking, T-PHILA. INouIRI-, Jan. 3, 2001, available at http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/kobrin/Research[The%20Philadelphia%20lnquirer.pdf (excellent discussion on the shrinking privacy space with
the advent of technology in communication).
4 51 Cal. 4th 84 (2011), cert. denied 244 P.3d 501 (2011).
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rantless search of the defendant's cell phone by law enforcement, failing to
recognize a trespass into personal property.5
Courts have long struggled to chart a precise trajectory for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 6 This quest for clarity has centered around two doctrinal pillars, as courts struggle to determine the scope, context and relevance of trespass
and privacy in stabilizing the contours of Fourth Amendment doctrine. However,
the incoherent judicial responses to warrantless smartphone searches may signal
the existence of uncertainty within the judiciary. Resolving this uncertainty requires an examination of limits placed by the Fourth Amendment on warrantless
smartphone searches. Seeking to peel back the interpretative gloss over this area,
this article explores the constitutional contours of trespass and privacy while tracing a path forward for applicability of the doctrine to the world of smartphones.
In addition to defining doctrinal parameters applicable to smartphones, I intend
to chart a new vista of understanding in synchronizing the legal contours with the
trajectory of technological development.
The development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence over the last few decades has been shaped by two fundamental doctrinal developments. First, courts
have gradually shifted away from the common law doctrine of trespass in favor of
5 People v. Diaz went to the California Supreme Court after an appellate court affirmed the
defendant's conviction. See People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding a drug
conviction based on a text message stating "6 4 80," which referred to the sale of six ecstasy pills for
eighty dollars). Since Diaz, several individuals have been convicted based on evidence obtained during warrantless searches of cell phones. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242 (4th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (affirming reliance on a cell phone's text messages to convict a defendant of heroin
distribution and sentence him to 420 months incarceration); United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d
1093 (D. Ariz. 2008) (relying on a cell phone's call history to link a defendant to a marijuana distribution ring); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (denying
motion to suppress use of a cell phone address book and call history to demonstrate that the defendant had been in contact with others in a drug conspiracy); People v. Shepard, No. H032876, 2008 WL
4824083, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2008) (upholding conviction where police officer "looked at the
text messages in the cell phone because he knew that 'cell phones are used to facilitate drug transactions"'); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009) (upholding a conviction for
intent to distribute crack cocaine based on call log information on a cell phone); see also Mark Miller,
California Supreme Court Allows Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, WEXLIR WALLACE LAw FIRM BLoo (May 11, 2011), http://blog.wexlerwallace.com/?p=809 (noting that cell phones
can be searched after arrest).
6 For example, the Supreme Court has never articulated a clear-cut definition of the physical
range of the search incident to arrest doctrine. The Justices have long found themselves embroiled in
arguments over how far beyond the person of the arrestee may be considered "within immediate
control," and subsequently have devised various constructs. In my view, the existing jurisprudential
inertia is borne out of a systemic reluctance to embrace postmodern privacy and general liberty concerns implicated within the two-century old Amendment. Other scholars and commentators have
discussed this disconnect between technology and law. E.g., Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine 57, AM. U. L. Rrv. 1381 (2008); see also Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring
Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep Up with Technological Change, U. luL. J.L. TECII. & Po.'y, Fall
2007, at 239.
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the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy, but the contemporary construction of the doctrine is a far cry from Justice Harlan's vision of a doctrine that
acts as a bulwark protecting individual privacy. Second, by relying on a rigid construction of physical trespass, courts have failed to recognize law enforcement
encroachment into the personal confines of individuals as trespass. The result of
these shifts has been an incremental expansion of police power, as well as a constraint of individual privacy interests and the right to be secure within one's personal space.
These developments prompt a fundamental question: How did the government
and its law enforcement agencies gain judicial approval to violate the privacy of
citizens with only the thinnest of excuses? Within the answer to this question
resides a realization that the trajectory of judicially approved warrantless
searches has been misguided all along. As law enforcement enjoys judicial approval to invade almost every sphere of privacy in our lives, the crucial need to
fundamentally reexamine Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should not be
delayed.7 This need for immediate reexamination of the doctrine is driven in part
by the technological saturation of postmodern society, 8 and has been exacerbated
by the judiciary's failure to apply the common law doctrine of trespass to
smartphones. 9
Against this backdrop of a shrinking zone of judicially protected individual
privacy, technological advances have opened an engaging dimension through
which postmodern individuals live wired and connected lives.' 0 For these wired
individuals, access to this interconnected dimension-made possible by devices
such as smartphones-is an indispensable part of life's journey. Yet, just as tech7 Law enforcement has enjoyed growing judicial acceptance of searches of cell phones incident
to arrest, prevailing under a growing panoply of judicially created exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. Police have prevailed under the automobile exception, inventory exception, exigency exception,
and pursuant to consent. Consent searches can be conducted without probable cause or a warrant so
long as police obtain free and voluntary permission to search the area, while the inventory exception
allows an administrative cataloging of items found in an impounded vehicle, thus making it possible to
find a cell phone but difficult to justify searching its contents. Under the automobile exception, police
are allowed to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle provided they have probable cause to believe
evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 368 F. App'x 95, 99
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (approving search of cell phone incident to arrest, though not conducting thorough analysis of the issue); see also United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 410-12 (4th
Cir. 2009) (upholding search incident to arrest of cell phone and rejecting argument that phones with
larger storage capacity should be treated differently than early-generation cell phones).
8 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of
User-GeneratedInformation Flows, 18 FORDIIAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 741 (2008) (descriptive discussion about technology-driven changes in communication through social networks).
9 See generally Harper, supra note 6.
10 See generally Saby Ghoshray, DoctrinalStress or in Need of a Face Lift? Examining Fourth
Amendment Applicability for Smartphones, 32 Wi rrriER L. REV. (2012).
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nological advancements cement our dependence on access to this dimension, judicially sanctioned law enforcement encroachments are on the rise.
Although the judiciary has recognized this encroachment, they have yet to arrive at a coherent response to it." Disproportionate judicial acquiescence to
prosecutorial and law enforcement interests has resulted in a doctrine whose
manifold exceptions stifle the Fourth Amendment's relevance to the modern
era. 12 This abrogation of individual privacy interests can only be fully appreciated
in light of an understanding of the gravity of the violation that an individual subjects themselves to by permitting police to intrude into his or her smartphone.' 3
The possibility of an intrusion upon an individual's personal space, even during a
minor traffic stop, threatens to deprive them of their sacred individuality and
runs counter to the constitutional grant of individual liberty.14
The objective of this article is two-fold. First, I argue for recognition of the
special characteristics of today's smartphones in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Such recognition should lead to a consideration of the harmful injury resulting
from trespass in the form of warrantless searches of smartphones. Second, I seek
to introduce a privacy-based prism through which warrantless searches of
smartphones should be viewed. It is my hope that this observation provides the
11 See supra note 5.
12 Here, I generally draw attention to excessive judicial deference to law enforcement's
prosecutorial interests, which has resulted in an erosion of individual privacy interests. Contextual
relevance within a systemic framework is critical to the evaluation of these two competing interests.
The post-9/11 judiciary tends to restrict the contours of individual privacy more than necessary in
furtherance of law enforcement's investigative purposes. This is achieved by judicial imputation of an
artificially high threshold of materiality to the interception of the evidence in question, providing law
enforcement with much wider latitude than necessary. In this construct, a "simple hunch," rather than
"probable cause," serves a sufficient justification for an invasion of an individual's privacy rights,
eroding modern conceptions of individual privacy and liberty interests.
13 Just as personal articles and belongings may be stored in a file cabinet, similar personal
information is frequently stored inside of a smartphone. An individual's life may revolve around her
Facebook or Twitter account, and communicative exchanges may be executed via her smartphone,
revealing information through the expressive means that the accompanying medium provides. In
much the same way that there is a need to protect identity and detailed personal information stored in
a file cabinet or a personal computer, the same level of privacy should be accorded to a Facebook or
Twitter account. It is important to recognize this fundamental disconnect between the judiciary's understanding of the privacy space that remains in the wake of technological advancement and the
reality of life as it is conducted on the internet. That is why commentators have assailed the tendency
of courts to unreflectively apply old constitutional jurisprudence to a new technological world. Even
the Supreme Court has recognized these rapid social changes and the judicial care they demand:
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communications and information transmission are evident
not just in the technology itself, but in what society accepts as proper behavior... . At present
. . . cell phone and text message communication are so pervasive that some persons may
consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression or even selfidentification. That might strengthen for an expectation for privacy.
See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2623 (2010).
14 Cf id.
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necessary impetus for the judiciary to take a fresh look at the danger of allowing
warrantless searches of smartphones, so that the fundamental liberty interests of
individuals remain intact in the face of technological advancement.
I.

TRESPASS:

A

MISSING ELEMENT IN THE DISTORTING TRAJECTORY?

The Framers' concern for protection from physical trespass is at the core of
Fourth Amendment. The construction of the Fourth Amendment reveals the desire of the Framers to protect against invasions of private homes by government
officials. Drawing from their notions of natural law, the Framers aspired to build
a society free of governmental intrusion into individual privacy. Their disdain for
the intrusive search, as recognized by a host of other scholars,' 5 manifested itself
in the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. As I have noted
elsewhere,' 6 a reading of the plain text of the Fourth Amendment will compel us
to see that the two clauses-the Unreasonableness Clause and the Warrant
Clause-are to be read in isolation and not in conjunction." This would imply
that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to secure privacy interests
from two distinct forms of governmental abrogation. This line of analysis is
shared by noted scholar Akhil Amar.' 8 While a comprehensive analysis of this
perspective is beyond the scope of this limited discourse, I have examined this
perspective more fully elsewhere.' 9
15 See infra note 24.
16 Ghoshray, supra note 10.
17 My view is informed by both my own understanding and other scholars' viewpoints. Consider this informative commentary by Thomas Y. Davies:
There has been a widespread consensus during the twentieth century about the basic meaning to be attributed to each of the two clauses of the text. The first clause has been understood to state a comprehensive principle-that the government shall not violate the "right to
be secure" by conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." The Supreme Court has
endorsed this understanding in numerous modern opinions, asserting, for example, that
"[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials . . . ." In fact,
Justices from across the ideological spectrum have treated the first clause as the essence of
the Fourth Amendment-even quoting it by itself as though it were the Fourth Amendment.
The second clause of the text-which starts "and no Warrants" and is commonly called "the
Warrant Clause"-has been understood to serve the more specific purpose of regulating warrant authority. Its effect is to ban the use of a "general warrant"-a framing-era term for an
unparticularized warrant (for example, ordering a search of "suspected places"), which was
also commonly applied to a warrant lacking a complaint under oath or an adequate showing
of cause.
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 Mici-i. L. REv. 547, 557-58 (1999),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=220868 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.220868 (omitting internal footnotes).
18 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994).

19

See Ghoshray, supra note 10.
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If the Framers' recognition of the inherent sanctity of individual homes is the
guidepost to which the Fourth Amendment is anchored, the time has come to
examine why this same sanctity should not be extended to smartphones, which in
many ways act as the refuge for the postmodern individual. The Framers' leeriness of the potential for government invasion of the home was reflected in Samuel Adams' admonition:
[T]hat the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress to
infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights of conscience; or to prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from
keeping their own arms; or to raise standing armies, unless when necessary
for the defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or to
prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly manner, the
federal legislature, for a redress of grievances; or to subject the people to
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, papers or
possessions.

20

The Fourth Amendment was predicated both upon the inherent sanctity of the
individual home and the Framers' deep-rooted distrust of general warrants. 21 The
Framers sought to ensure that searches of homes based only on general warrants
would be prohibited. Protection against government intrusion, as structured
within the ban against warrantless searches, must therefore be recognized as the
central operative concept of the Fourth Amendment protection against search
and seizure. This reality is reflected in the Framers' discussions during the period
prior to the drafting and ratification of the Fourth Amendment:
The most significant element of the amendment was ... the generic concept
of [unreasonable search and seizure]. The amendment's first clause, which
explicitly renounces all unreasonable searches and seizures, overshadows
the second clause, which implicitly renounced only a single category, the
general warrant. The Framers of the amendment were less concerned with a
right against general warrants than with the broader rights those warrants
infringed.... [t]he history that preceded the Fourth Amendment . .. reveals
a depth and complexity that transcends language. To think of the amendment as a right against general warrants disparages its intricacy. The amendment expressed not a single idea but a family of ideas whose identity and
22
dimensions developed in historical context.
20

DEBATES AND PROCIEDINGS IN TH1E CONVENTION OF FIE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACIIU-

SEYS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788 86-87 (Boston, William White, Printer to the Commonwealth 1856).

21

Id.

22

See WILIAM J. CuDomviy, TilE FoURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING

602-1791 757-825 (2009).
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Critics might question how I draw a connection between the sanctity of homes
and smartphones. The answer may be found though an examination of the history
and scope of the constitutional protection from intrusion contained in the person,
houses, and effects component of the Fourth Amendment. 23 In their quest to
determine how far Fourth Amendment protections extend, states have reached
inconsistent conclusions, determining variously that searches are to be prohibited
on all premises, on land only, or within the house. This is nothing new. The Framers struggled to reach a consensus on the scope of Fourth Amendment protections even during the ratification debate. In trying to locate a terminal contour of
individual privacy rights, the Framers found themselves locked in a dichotomy
between possession and property. The central issue of the debate during this
framing period thus became how to structure the textual framework of the Fourth
Amendment.
Differing conceptions of protection characterized the debates surrounding the
ratification of the Fourth Amendment. For example, confronting the possessionproperty dichotomy, James Madison espoused a much broader view of protected
rights, adopting property interests as the organizing principle of privacy protections.2 4 On the other hand, Henry Lee argued vigorously for an amendment that
23 Id.
24 My analysis of the framing period's views regarding privacy and general warrants has been
informed and guided by various commentaries, historical letters, treaties and law review articles, only
a few of which are cited here. Among the law review articles and books, see generally JACOn W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCii AND SEIZURE AND Tin- SUPREME CouRT: A STUDY IN CONsTrruIoNAL INTERPRETATION (1966); Joseph J. Stengel, Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 3 U. RiciI. L. Ri-v. 278 (1969); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390-98 (1974); Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment:
The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV. 33, 34-43 (1979-80); Poiyvros G.
PoLvviou, SEARCH & SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW 1-19 (1982); Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 'Principled Basis' Rather than an 'Empirical
Proposition'?, 16 CRIAGIHTON L. REV. 565, 571-79 (1983); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 281-95 (1984); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp
v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure Cases, 83 Co-UM. L. REv. 1365, 1372-80 (1983); Martin Grayson, The Warrant Clause in
Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107 (1987); John M.A. DiPippa, Is the Fourth Amendment
Obsolete? Restating the Fourth Amendment in Functional Terms, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 483 (1986-1987);
Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of 'Search' in the Fourth Amendment: A
Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 550-59 (1988). Among the texts and writings of the
framing period, see generally SIR EDWARD COKE, FOURTH PART OF TIE INSTITUTES OFTIE LAWS o
ENGLAND 176-77 (Professional Books Ltd. 1986) (1644); 2 SElUE.ANT WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OE
Tn CRowN 82 (1721) (one of the most complete contemporaneous treatments of criminal procedure
available to the framers); 2 LGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123-34 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965). Among the letters of the framing period, see William Henry Drayton, A Letter
AMERICAN REVOLUfrom Freeman, (Aug. 10, 1774), reprinted in I DOCUMENTARY HisroRy 01 inTION 11, 15 (R.W. Gibbes ed., 1855, reprinted 1972); 3 TUIE DEl3ArES IN TiHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TiH AnOI-I-ION 01 TI-E FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 587-88 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1838, reprinted in 1937); LiE TTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO GEORGE EVE (Jan. 2,1789) (reprintedin
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would establish the sanctity of a "person's houses, and papers." 25 The Framers'
understanding of the common law and Sir Edward Coke's recognition that a penalty provision is required to deter trespassing 26 offer further evidence of the
framing era's view of the Fourth Amendment. Samuel Adams seems to have
viewed privacy protections based on property interests as generally broader than
those based on possession:
[O]ur homes and even our bedchambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our
boxes chests & trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches,
whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants;
whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares
etc. for which the dutys have not been paid. Flagrant instances of the wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this and other sea
port Towns. By this we are cut off from that domestick security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreable. Those Officers may under colour of law and the cloak of a general warrant, break
thro' the sacred rights of the Domicil, ransack mens houses, destroy their
securities, carry off their property, and with little danger to themselves commit the most horred murders.2 7
These snapshots portray a framing era that gave great deference to the individual's possessory interest in their belongings, and sought to codify within the Constitution a privacy protection mechanism that would secure that possessory
interest against government intrusion. This resulted in the incorporation of the
word "effects" 28 to encompass a more comprehensive meaning of possessory objects. Understanding the broader possessory interest embodied within this word
is fundamental to recognizing the full spectrum of rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Even if a prohibition against physical trespass is not recognized
within the word "effects," it nonetheless expands the meaning of protection from
intrusion to include protection against government deprivation of possessory
interest.29
11 TIE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 404-05 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)) (explicitly referring
to the need to ban "general warrants" and to preserve jury trial).
25 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (October 27,1787), reprinted in 2 THIE
LErERus OE RicI-ARD HENRY LEE 456, 457 (James Curtis Ballagh ed., 1914). See generally supra note

24.
26 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
571-72, 630-31, 697-99 (1999).
27 See A STATE OF THm Ricirrs OE TiIE COLONISTS (likely authored by Samuel Adams), reprinted in TRAcrs OF T~lE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763-1776 127, 150-51 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967).

28
29

Id.
Id.
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Driven partly by a strict physical intrusion requirement under the warrant
clause, post-Katz3 0 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence witnessed a gradual unraveling of robust privacy protection in favor of a law enforcement-friendly framework. Subsequently, contemporary jurisprudence failed to recognize today's
smartphone as an "effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment intended by the Framers. Recognizing this broader meaning of "effects" will resuscitate rights that have been dormant for some time. Embracing this vision of
protection from government intrusion draws us closer to a privacy paradigm that
is consistent with the original intent of the Fourth Amendment. Though this
might seem simplistic, the alternative is the post-Katz exception-based Fourth
Amendment evolution. This ad-hoc evolution has led to inconsistent outcomes
among state and federal courts and has stripped the Fourth Amendment of its
role as a robust defense against government intrusion into individual privacy.
In allowing warrantless searches of smartphones in both People v. Diaz31 and
33
United States v. Curtis,32 but declining to allow such a search in Ohio v. Smith,
the judiciary has revealed its fractured understanding of the status of
smartphones under the Fourth Amendment. Although this jurisprudential chaos
does not bring us closer to establishing a definitive bright-line rule vis-A-vis
smartphones, it does leave the door open for an independent analysis to take
hold. United States v. Karo3 4 established that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and are permissible subject to only a few limited exceptions.
This recognition of the "presumptively unreasonable"3 5 nature of warrantless
searches is more consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment than the post-Katz doctrinal evolution described above.
II.

PRIVACY:

CAN THIs FLEETING RIGHT
IN SMARTPHONES?

BE RESURRECTED

The smartphone debate must be grounded on a core privacy doctrine. More
than a century ago, scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued for a
deeper and more fundamental right to privacy36 than had been previously recognized. This discourse has since been muted by jurisprudential solicitude for the
law enforcement and security interests of the state, particularly in light of the
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105 (Cal. 2011).
32 635 F.3d 704 (5th Cir. 2011).
33 124 Ohio St. 3d 163 (Ohio 2009).
34 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
35 Id. at 717.
36 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
37 See supra note 12.
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post-9/11 exigent circumstances framework." In the face of these competing concepts, privacy rights have taken a backseat. Justice Brandeis' observation is more
relevant today than ever before:
Now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to
be left alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to comprise every form of possession-intangible, as well as tangible.3 9
Our determination of whether privacy is a fundamental issue that must be confronted in cases involving smartphones is a function of our understanding of the
importance of underlying liberty interests in postmodern society. Warren and
Brandeis used the right to privacy as a foundation upon which they established
the broader "right to be let alone." 40 This plea for privacy in the face of nineteenth century technological advancement resonates today as society evolves
through further technological changes. Can Warren and Brandeis' theory help us
sort out the applicability of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to smartphones?
Here we must recognize that advances in communication technology, although
beneficial, have also created new opportunities for intrusion by law enforcement.
Warren and Brandeis recognized the enhanced potential for intrusion into private
space created by technological advancements. In their construction of the "right
to be left alone," they revealed a deep understanding of an individual's funda4
mental privacy interests, and cautioned against invasion of those interests. ' A
premise of this construction is a conception of privacy as a building block, an
essential ingredient of an individual's fulfillment of his or her destiny. In the pursuit of such destiny, the individual must be given a private space that is impervious to government intrusion. Taken to its logical conclusion, this construction
requires that an individual be able draw the boundary lines of his or her own
42
sphere of privacy wherein he or she has the right to be left alone.
If we apply such a right to privacy, analogous to that of the interior of a home,
to the context of an electronic community of interconnected individuals, respect
for privacy commands non-intrusion of the home-like environment. These homelike environments are created through smartphones which allow familial communities to interact though forums such as Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace. This
sphere of privacy arises in part as a result of the enhanced capabilities of modern
smartphones. Smartphones are the catalysts for the communication required to
form the postmodern electronic community. By enabling communication
38 See generally Saby Ghoshray, Untangling the Legal Paradigmof Indefinite Detention: Security, Liberty and False Dichotomy in the Aftermath of 9/11, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 249 (2006).
39 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 197.
40 Id. at 204-06.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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amongst all individual members of such a community, smartphones foster a sense
of belonging within that community. An intrusion into an individual's
smartphone has the collateral consequence of desecrating the privacy of both the
individual and the community. Technology's explosion has reconfigured our way
of life. It has morphed the manner in which the postmodern individual conducts
life, connects with the world, and occupies cyberspace. However, fundamental
precepts of law must not change. They may shape their trajectory to adapt and
accommodate for the needs of a changing world, but the overlay of the law on
these altered lifestyles should not lead to deprivations of fundamental liberties
such as the right to privacy and the right to be left alone.
Technological sophistication has also revealed an Achilles' heel of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence: privacy violations in cyberspace involving the thirdparty doctrine. Purchasing items online, for example, typically requires an individual to leave identifying information with a third party. Refusing to recognize
the privacy interests of the individual in the medium of that transaction creates a
license for law enforcement to access such identifying information online. Similarly, conducting a three-way video chat via smartphones may allow an individual
to avoid the cost of travel and a conference room rental, but typically requires an
online registration through which the individual divulges identifying information
to a third-party vendor. Such acts should not constitute a waiver of the privacy
interests of these individuals. They would have retained their privacy rights had
they gone to a conference room and closed the door before conducting their
meeting. Therefore, the law-specifically the third-party doctrine-must be
reconfigured so that our evolving technological landscape does not result in a
diminution of the individual's quantum of protected privacy.
Societal dynamics and communicative modalities have changed since Justice
Harlan articulated the privacy-centric Katz test. 43 Updating Facebook, using hash
tags to communicate with a chosen community on Twitter, and texting to express
emotions have become the communicative norm, and these behavioral patterns
are protected by the same reasonable expectation of privacy articulated in Katz.
43 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). While
referring to Justice Harlan's famous test in Katz, Peter Winn observed that
[In] Justice Harlan's concurrence on its merits, we have seen that in working on the reasonable expectation of privacy test, he refined the test in his own way, adding both a subjective
and an objective component. Perhaps he thought that the subjective component was needed
to clarify that, although an objective expectation of privacy might exist, a subjective expectation might not, as when a person in his (objectively private) home is overheard intentionally
speaking in a loud voice out of on open window. . . . Perhaps Justice Harlan felt the subjective component of the test was still needed to mirror the old trespass element that an intrusion lack permission. However, when applying the test in subsequent cases, even Harlan
himself only referenced the objective component.
Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test, 40 McGEORGE L.
Ri~v. 11 (2009).
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However, a combination of a post-Katz shift away from the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, judicial dilution of individual privacy space, and the
emergence of the third-party doctrine" has had the effect of gradually weakening
individual privacy in technology-enhanced communication. Restoring the sanctity
of privacy and recognizing its importance in postmodern life will bring the doctrine closer to what was envisioned in the framing era.
Why has Fourth Amendment jurisprudence failed to inculcate a robust framework to deal with the privacy issues presented by smartphones? Courts have employed a strict constructionist approach to reject claims of a reasonable
expectation of privacy made by individuals who have voluntarily shared information with a third party.45 If we examine the pace of technological advancement 46
and its symmetrizing impact on individuals within that society, 47 we are able to
44 The need for either a reinterpretation or a complete overhaul of the third-party doctrine has
been argued from both sides of the aisle. Within the context of scholarship criticizing the doctrine
there remain two distinct groups. I consider the first group as trailblazers who began the movement of
professing the doctrinal difficulties created by technological advancement in the 1980s. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MIciI. L. RIev.
1229 (1983); Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's FourthAmendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 COL. L. RLv. 1751, 1757-58 (1994); Gerald G. Ashdown, The FourthAmendment and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy, 34 VAND. L. Rev. 1289, 1315 (1981). While these
articles questioned the doctrine's continued viability even before the mass embrace of cyberspace
enabled social media, the second group has relied on much the same reasoning to argue even more
persuasively against the doctrine from a contemporary perspective. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. RIv. 1083, 1093-94 (2002);
Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in
Stored TransactionalData, 14 J.L. & PoL'Y 211 (2006); Susan Freiwald, First Principlesof Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECii. L. RI v. 3; Stephen Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth

Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties,and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PiP. L.
REv. 975 (2007); CHIisroviPR SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: Tiii Ni~w GOVERNMENT SuasVIeIILANCE AN) FOURTH AMENoMunNT 151-64 (2007); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L.

Rr.v. 101, 113 (2008); Jack Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
RvV. 1, 19 (2008). On the other hand, scholars have argued passionately as to why the doctrine should
retain continued relevance in jurisprudence. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 60 STAN. L. Rv. 503, 519-22 (2007); Fred Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a
Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 460 (2008); Orin Kerr, The Case for the ThirdParty Doctrine, 107 Micii. L. REv. 561 (2009).
45 Cuomy, supra note 22, at 757-825.

46 See James X. Dempsey, DigitalSearch & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protectionsto Keep Pace
with Technology, 865 PLI/PAT 505, 523 (2006).
47 By symmetry in this context, I draw attention to the symmetrizing pattern with which law
enforcement officials have conducted a massive campaign of misinformation, as I have shown elsewhere and others scholars have noted, within which a single-minded focus on national security has
been advanced as justification for almost anything. The pervasiveness of this campaign has imposed
upon individuals within the society an artificial sense of insecurity that is difficult to disrupt. In much
the same way, inertia acts upon a physical object to prevent any change from its initial status. Here I
refer to the monolithic tendency of an individual within a symmetric social order to follow the lead,
'like lambs to the slaughter.' In this existence, the individual rationalizes not only her false needs for
security, but also her requirement of symmetry within the environment, in such a way that rationality

SMARTPHONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

85

get a better sense of the manner in which individuals become bound to instant
communication-centric lifestyles 48 and the machines, like smartphones, that enable those lifestyles. Yet, more often than not, courts have continued to make
judgments of individuals' Fourth Amendment interests relying on doctrinal
frameworks and sensibilities that do not comport with evolving societal expectations of privacy.49
Ironically, today's technology, and the individual's immersion within it, compels us to look deeper into the third-party doctrine. Without voluntarily disclosing identifying information, a smartphone subscriber will not be able to
communicate within their chosen community and virtually will not be able to
exist within their self-selected society. Taken to its logical extreme, such an individual may be prevented from pursuing their livelihood on account of their failure to adopt some fundamental social conventions. The disconnect that results,
through which an individual must choose between maintaining their constitutional privacy protections and existing within postmodern society, emanates from
the individual's reliance on a third party technology provider and the law's refusal to shield that interaction from governmental intrusion.50
The fundamental disconnect between the judiciary's failure to recognize the
distortion of privacy protections caused by the third-party doctrine's application
to modern technology and individual aspirations toward privacy in today's technology-driven era has not gone unnoticed. As commentators have decried this
privacy loss, even the Supreme Court has taken notice of the rapid acceleration
of both societal changes and individual privacy loss:
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communications and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself, but in what society
accepts as proper behavior. . . . At present .. . [c]ell phone and text message
communication are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be
essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-iden51
tification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation for privacy.
This recognition of the communicative needs of today's individual predicated
upon their self-expression and self-identification is an encouraging sign. Moreover, findings that used to be legitimate for the Court in the era between the 1960s
cannot penetrate the artificial barrier structured around her consciousness. This distorted rationality
is therefore a vital ingredient in the perpetuation of symmetry. See Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power: Examining the Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 165 (2008).

48 Id.
49 1 refer generally to the third-party doctrine and lack of specificity and contextual delineation
in blanket applications of the doctrine, which accounts for the current doctrinal stress.
50 See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationalefor Reinterpretationof the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
51 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
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and 1980s 52 may no longer be justifiable. Where technological realities mandate
that personal information be managed by third parties, the contours of the thirdparty doctrine must be reinterpreted. This reinterpretation must be predicated
upon privacy. In evaluating the contours of this privacy, care must be given to
recognize that an individual technology user's interaction with her communication provider is qualitatively different from her interaction with law enforcement
entities. While the former interaction, that of sharing subscriber information, is a
stepping stone of preprocessing necessary to complete communication, 5 3 the latter interaction is much more meaningful, much more qualitatively significant in
its intrusive nature, and likely to result in a vastly different outcome.
CONCLUSION

This article emerged from an identification of jurisprudential asymmetry in
applying Fourth Amendment analysis to smartphones. As courts faced with similar cases have reached inconsistent outcomes, we have been awakened to a
deeper stress within the doctrinal foundations of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 54 My inquiry has been prompted by the failure of modern jurisprudence to
account for technology's sophistication in the development of the law. As such,
this concise analysis has focused on documenting the growing disconnect between
these two important aspects of postmodem lives.
52

See supra note 22.

53

See PRaSTON GRALIA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 87 (2001) (describing how e-mails are

transmitted).
54 In my view, the meaning of the Warrant Clause is essentially dependent on a proper understanding of the "probable cause" language of the Fourth Amendment. The Constitution does not
explicitly define "probable cause." The meaning of the term has been shaped over decades and has
entered our jurisprudence by means of judicial construct. Historical construction suggests that its
usage was intended for situations in which an applicant for a warrant was required to submit relevant
and contextual facts to the magistrate, sufficient for a reasonable officer to engage in a determination
of probable cause. As the Supreme Court noted:
In determining what is probable cause ... [w]e are concerned only with the question whether
the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit . . . for the belief that the law
was being violated on the premises to be searched, and if the apparent facts set out in the
affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that
there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance
of a warrant.
See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925). "[T]he term 'probable cause' . . . means less
than evidence which would justify condemnation." See also Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.)
339, 348 (1813); see also Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1925). Furthermore, it is considered to rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial, see Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), and it need not be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial, see
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-08
(1965). For contemporary scholarship, see Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable
Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLo. L.
REV. 3 (1998).
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First, the judiciary's distorting journey through an inconsistent doctrinal development has failed to incorporate the Framers' view of protection from governmental intrusion into the concept of private space protected by the Fourth
Amendment. This jurisprudential inconsistency is the result of conflating the
original meaning of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment by failing to take
into account early Americans' focus on creating a bulwark against trespass into
the private confines of citizens. We must recognize that the framing period's notion of justice and their constitutional construction were informed by their experiences with governmental excesses. Yet, the transition from the framing era to the
post-industrial revolution's capitalism introduced an era of special solicitude for
law enforcement. As the judiciary has sublimated the fundamental liberty interests of citizens to the administrative interests of government, I find that the original intent of the Fourth Amendment has been subsumed by its exceptions. The
victim has been the common law conception of protection against physical intrusion into private space-an area that must be reinvigorated within the context of
smartphones. This article is a reminder that, by making the scope, context, and
boundary of a search warrant the operative content of the Fourth Amendment,
the Framers ensured that their view of life and liberty would be reflected in the
Fourth Amendment.
My second observation in this article focuses on the distortion of the Fourth
Amendment wrought by a judiciary which has given undue weight to governmental administrative objectives over individual privacy protections. This is problematic on several fronts, only a few of which I have outlined within this discourse.
By expanding the exception paradigm, the judiciary has given law enforcement a
virtual carte blanche to disregard the Fourth Amendment under any one of a
litany of exceptions. Moreover, the judiciary is increasingly deferring doctrinal
constructions of the Fourth Amendment to precedential Supreme Court opinions
without adequately analyzing the factual variations among the disputes. I have
addressed this foundational problem with a deeper examination of the constitutional trajectory and it historical roots elsewhere. 55
I do not see any material distinction among variants of technology-enabled
surveillance devices, beepers, thermal imaging devices, and GPS devices. 56 All of
55 See supra note 10.
56 It can be argued that there may not be conceptual difference between beeper technology and
GPS technology, except for the elegance of design and speed of communication. Others have noted
that:
In many ways, beeper technology was in the 1980s what GPS technology is today. In the past,
courts dealt with the use of beepers as tracking devices. While beepers are smaller and less
sophisticated than GPS devices, their use as law enforcement tools is strikingly similar to the
use of GPS devices. Both types of devices can be concealed on a suspect's vehicle and allow
police to obtain information related to the suspect's location and movements. To analyze
electronic tracking through the use of beepers, courts focused on Fourth Amendment con-
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them have a similar potential to intrude into the privacy of an individual's dwelling. It is by examining the inner confines of a private residence that an individual's behavioral norms, private expressions, thoughts, and emotions are revealed.
While technology establishes new social norms and modes of individual expression, the law has remained stale. Individuals express their emotions through text
messages and tweets. They reveal to a chosen community the inner workings of
their minds. Recognizing the expanded capabilities of smartphones must lead us
to the logical conclusion that their warrantless search is neither reasonably expected nor welcomed. It is predominantly due to difficulties in identifying both
the privacy and trespass issues that the exceptional place of smartphones in an
evolving understanding of the Fourth Amendment has not gained currency in our
current discourse. Life in the twenty-first century is increasingly conducted
through modes of smartphone-enabled communication. Therefore, if privacy interests belong to these private spheres, why not extend the same privacy interests
to the owners and users to such communicative media as Twitter, Facebook and
smartphones? While we consider this, let us also emphasize the aspects of the
Fourth Amendment which protect against government trespass-aspects which
have been subsumed through the judiciary's excessive solicitude toward law enforcement interests.

cerns, trying to determine whether or not a "search" had occurred. In order to answer this
question, courts focused, among other things, on the method of attachment of the beeper, the
monitoring of the beeper for tracking purposes, the expectation of privacy in public and
private places, and the enhancement of police officers' senses.
Ramya Shah, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth Amendment Keep Up with Electronic Tracking
Technology? 2009 U. lu . J.L. T~cii. & Po.'v 281, 281 (2009) (providing an example of law enforcement's use of a GPS device to tie a suspect to crime).

